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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1955
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
Public Assistance
Early in the year the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the power of the
state Department of Public Welfare to, in effect, carve out a special pro-
gram for aid to the permanently and totally disabled from the general poor
relief program established under Ohio Revised Code, section 5113.01 et
seq.1 In State ex rel. Robison v. H,-nderson,2 it was held that a mandamus
action would lie to compel the commissioners of Harrison County to
comply with -the provisions of a "State Plan" promulgated by the Depart-
ment in reliance upon the broad powers conferred by Ohio Revised Code,
section 5113.09.s This decision was a highly important one to the Public
Assistance program in this state since the General Assembly has un-
accountably failed to provide a separate statutory base for this new cate-
gory of aid to the indigent, and the continued receipt of federal funds
for state-wide grants to the disabled has hung in the balance.4 Most of
those familiar with the problem agree that a firmer and more specific legis-
lative base for this special program is still highly desirable.
'Congress, in the enactment of the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act, de-
dined to adopt a permanent and total disability insurance program, but did provide
for a new categorical Public Assistance program to afford aid to these unfortunate
individuals on a needs basis. This "fourth category" was patterned after the already
existing programs, in part federally financed, for old age assistence, aid to dependent
children, and aid to the blind. In order to share in the federal funds made available
for this new program, each state was required to develop and submit a "plan" which
would meet minimum federal standards as outlined in the Social Security Act, a
procedure which has become familiar through experience with the older categories.
Officials of the Ohio agency felt that the powers conferred under Revised Code,
Chapter 5113, which provided for a general relief program entirely distinct and
separate from the so-called "categorical" programs, were broad enough to permit the
establishment of this new program by regulation. This decision was not exactly
unique, since other states have contrived to find equally broad authority in their
existing statutes for the establishment of "plans" for categorical assistance programs
and have avoided the necessity of new legislation, in numerous instances.
2 162 Ohio St. 504, 124 N.E.2d 150 (1955).
'Including the general power to make rules, to require reports from local relief
authorities, to determine the kinds of obligations for poor relief on which state reim-
bursement will be based, and to cooperate with agencies of the state, federal and
local governments.
'One of the conditions for federal grants to the state is that the program shall be
state-wide, i.e., in effect in every county of the state. Harrison County's challenge,
therefore, affected much more than the relatively small number of cases among its
own people. At stake, perhaps, was the independence of local voices in the relief
program, but otherwise the misgivings expressed in the opinions of the two dissenting
judges do not seem too well-founded.
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Unemployment Insurance
Labor Dispute Disqualification
In Cornell v. Bailey,5 the Ohio Supreme Court removed any remaining
doubt concerning the scope and application of the labor dispute disqualifi-
cation provision in the Ohio act.6 The drivers and helpers of a wholesale
grocery business had gone out on strike, and the lack of normal delivery
service eventually resulted in a substantial curtailment of the employer's
business. The claimants were not members of the striking union, were not
concerned in the dispute, and did not participate in any way. Neverthe-
less it was properly held that the claimants were not entitled to unem-
ployment benefits since their lay-off was a result of the strike.7
However, where a worker was replaced by another while he was absent
on sick leave and found himself out of a job when he attempted to return,
a subsequent strike will not disqualify him even though he thereafter be-
comes a member of the striking union."
In what is believed to be the first Ohio decision on the point, it was
held that the Zanesville plant of the Timken Roller Bearing Co. was a
separate establishment from the company's Canton plants where a strike
had occurred, and the resulting unemployment among the Zanesville
workers, for this reason, did not incur disqualification. 9 This highly sig-
nificant decision is in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions where
the same question has been raised. The court was of the opinion that the
phrase "factory, establishment, or other premises," referred to a single
place or location.
Discharge for just Cause
Quite a number of cases involved the question of disqualification re-
sulting from a discharge.
' 163 Ohio St. 50, 125 N.E.2d 323 (1955). This is the same case referred to in
footnote 23 of last year's article, 6 WEST. RES. L. REv. 297 (1955), the higher court
affirming the decision of the court of appeals.
' Under this provision, no individual may receive benefits for the duration of any
period of unemployment with respect to which it is found he "lost his employment
or has left his employment by reason of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out) at
the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was employed, as long as
such labor dispute continues."
'The court recognized that the Ohio provision fails to include the "escape" clause
contained in the statutes of many other states, pointing out that the Guthrie bill in
the 98th General Assembly would have introduced such a provision but that the per-
tinent language was stricken before the amendments passed.
'Donofrio v. Administrator, CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8479 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1955).
"McGee v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8505 (Ohio
Com. P1. 1955).
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Where a charwoman was discharged as a result of garnishment of her
wages, it was held that such discharge was not for just cause in connection
with her work, and the disqualification did not apply.'0 The court in-
dicated that the result might be different in the case of an executive of the
bank or one of the tellers. For similar reasons, a worker was not dis-
qualified where he had been discharged because of trouble the union had
with him."
Failure to establish that the discharge was for just cause resulted, and
benefits were allowed, where there had merely been an argument resulting
from an honest disagreement,' 2 as well as where the worker was absent for
several days due to illness but had notified the company nurse the day he
left, and his wife had tried unsuccessfully to reach the same nurse on sub-
sequent days. 13
On the other hand, disqualification was upheld in the following situa-
tions: where the discharge was the result of absenteeism totaling 202 hours
in a 24-week period, and no medical substantiation of alleged illness was
presented;' 4 where the claimant started a fight by throwing debris in
front of a co-worker's bench; 15 where a cab driver smelled of liquor on the
job, after being duly warned, and went to sleep in his cab away from the
dispatcher's office contrary to regulations;' 6 where the percentage of re-
jects of switches assembled by claimant had increased materially during a
3-week period;' 7 and where the claimant had violated a company rule
against smoking at her desk and closing the office door on two occasions.' 8
Voluntary Quit Withoat Just Cause
A worker who moved from Columbus to Pomeroy while she was out
of work as result of a labor dispute and who refused to return when notified
to do so, but asked for a transfer to a job nearer her new home instead, was
held to -be disqualified from receiving benefits for having quit without
" Chalker v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 126 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio Com. P.
1955).
"' ayman v. Administrator, CCH U. I. Smtv. (Ohio) 5 8508 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955).
" Free v. Circle Cab Co., Inc., CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8492 (Ohio Corn. Pl.
1955).
'"Allen v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. Snav. (Ohio) 5 8480 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1955).
'Pry v. Tube Products Corp., CCII U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8482 (Ohio Com. PL
1955).
'"Renaker v. Globe Wernicke Co., CCII U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8507 (Ohio Com.
Pl. 1955).
"
8Minor v. B.U.C., CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8459 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
' Bruney v. Administrator, CCH U. I. SRV. (Ohio) 5 8468 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
' Federal Glass Co. v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8469 (Ohio
Com. P1. 1955).
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just cause.19 But where the claimant quit to accept another, temporary
job, on the advice of his foreman who said that work was getting slack,
just cause was found to exist and benefits were allowed for unemploy-
ment following the temporary job.20
Refusa of Suitable Work
In Culp v. Board of Reziew,2 ' the claimant had refused two job offers,
one for night work which would have interfered with the care of her 11-
year-old daughter and the other for paint spraying which had previously
caused her skin trouble. On the strength of the Supreme Court's decision
in the Leonard case,22 the court reversed the ruling of the Board of Review
and held that the claimant's limitation on her hours of work was reasonable
under the circumstances and that she had good cause for refusing the paint
spray job, so that benefits should be allowed.2 3
The question of moral grounds for refusing work arose again last year,
and this time the ruling was against the claimant. The proffered job would
have involved working on Sunday, and the claimant was an active church
worker who frequently attended as many as three worship services on the
Sabbath and objected to giving up her religious activities. She neglected,
however, to testify that working on Sunday would violate the law of God
or that she would be expelled from her church for so doing, and this was
her undoing.2 4 The Tary case " was distinguished on the ground that
neither of the latter two elements was present.
"Keeton v. Administrator, CCH U. I. Simv. (Ohio) § 8460 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955).
'Seibert v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 8461 (Ohio Com. P1.
1955). Also, where the job of a 65-year old worker was changed by adding func-
dons and making it more difficult, he was considered to have just cause for quitting,
Weaver v. United Woolen Co., CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8493 (Ohio Com. PL
1955); but where a cook walked out because her employer accused her of loafing
for 30 minutes, held, just cause did not exist, Cost v. Board of Review, CCH U. I.
SERv. (Ohio) 1 8510 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
*CCH U. I. SEV. (Ohio) 5 8477 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
* 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N.E.2d 567 (1947).
'A refreshing decision reflecting a more liberal view than many, in contrast with
the view that availability is an around-the-dock proposition, regardless of circum-
stances. The Supreme Court's opinion in the Leonard case is also a landmark in this
respect, and aptly cited.
'"Lowery v. Administrator, CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8470 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955).
Although it may have been considered that the claimant would still have her even-
ings to devote to the church, her activity in behalf of the organization attempting to
carry on God's work is bound to be much more limited if she accepts a Sunday job.
In the case of a woman as active in the church as the court's statement indicates, it
would hardly seem too much of a strain to take judicial notice of the admonition in
the Bible to remember the Sabbath and keep it holy, and that Sunday is a day of
rest, and this should be moral grounds enough for her refusal.
0 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954), discussed at some length in the 1954
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Available for Work
Opposing views as to what constitutes availability and an active search
for work were well illustrated in two decisions rendered during 1955.
Where a carpenter who had been laid off moved away from the city,
after registering with his union business agent, to Racine, Ohio, a relatively
small community, where he had no previous employment history, he was
found to be unavailable for work notwithstanding his application at a
local furniture store for a job as a salesman, and at a steel plant across
the river 6 But where another claimant living in a rural area contacted
four or five employers a week looking for work, the same eligibility re-
quirement was considered satisfied 7 Even taking into account a possible
difference in degree and a slightly different work history, the latter view
seems more in keeping with both the letter and the purpose of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law.
Miscellaneous Benefit Questions
In Cornell v. Dalpiaz,28 the court ruled that a trade school set up by
Survey, 6 WESM. RES. L. REV. 295 (1955). It is doubtful that the majority opinion
in the Tary case can properly be limited to the extent that the court in the instant case
seems to indicate. The basic principle enunciated in Judge Lamneck's opinion should
apply to Christians in any church who consider the issue a moral one, whether or not
they express their views as absolutely or as vehemently as do some others. A sincere
rejection of such an offer by an active Christian should be enough to indicate a moral
issue, at least so far as that individual is concerned. Businesses which see fit to op-
erate on the day generally recognized as the Sabbath in this country hardly need
the support which this decision indirectly gives them, and a governmental policy
which encourages more rather than less business as usual on Sunday hardly seems
sound, particularly where it seems to originate in the courts. The labor force surely
contains enough individuals who have no moral convictions on this point, or who
celebrate the Sabbath on another day of the week, to avoid strangulation of Sunday
business if a different interpretation of the statute were adopted.
101n re Pickens, CCH U. I. SEuv. (Ohio) 5 8465 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955). The
court based its decision, in part, upon the conclusion that a claimant cannot delegate
the duty of actively seeking work to a business agent, it being something which the
individual must carry out personally, following the view in Clemmer Construction
Co. v. Scott, CCH U. I. SiRv. (Ohio) 5 8332 (1952), in preference to that ex-
pressed in Nelson v. Van Horn Construction Co., 45 Ohio Op. 378 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1951). The choice is hardly one to be applauded, representing as it does a rather
narrow and unenlightened point of view. Cf. Louise F. Freeman, Availability: Ac-
tive Search for Work, 10 OHIO ST. L J. 181 (1949).
' Abbott v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. SRV. (Ohio) 5 8487 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1955). Removal to the rural area must have been the basis for the adverse ruling
of the Board of Review, since the Bureau has a rule of thumb that two calls a week
is normally sufficient to establish an active search. Cf. Culp v. Board of Review,
supra, note 21, in which the court indicated that the requirement had been met where
only one call had been made in some weeks but three or more calls had been made
in most weeks involved.
" 128 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio App. 1952).
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the Veteran's Administration is not an established educational institution
within the meaning of section 4141.29 of the act (subparagraph C-8), and
it was held that a claimant attending such a school remained available for
work where he could attend either day or evening classes and was con-
scientiously seeking employment.
A claimant who was living on a small farm but had never worked on
it for his livelihood, having kept it rented out on shares, was held to be un-
employed rather than self-employed after losing his city job.29
In an important test case concerning the retroactivity of benefit in-
creases contained in the 1949 amendments to the state law, it was held that
the administrator could not reopen claims which became final prior to
the effective date of the amendments, and that benefit determinations be-
come final if there is no appeal therefrom within a ten day period.30
Right to Appeal
In several decisions it was made abundantly clear that a notice of appeal
from an administrative decision under this act must clearly state the errors
complained of.38  However, an appeal assigning as error that the decision
of the Board of Review was not sustained by the evidence, was contrary
to law, and contained other errors "apparent in the record," was held suf-
ficiently specific to meet the statutory requirement.3 2 Failure to serve the
employer with a notice of appeal within the time fixed by statute proved
to be fatal.3 3 And where the appellant-employer failed to appear at the
hearing of claimant's appeal before a referee, it was held that the Board
of Review properly denied an attempt to institute further appeal for the
purpose of presenting new evidence.8
4
Experience Rating
By its ruling in Apex Smelting Co. v. Cornell,35 the Ohio Supreme
Court has definitely settled the question of succession to an experience
'Woodruff v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8456 (Ohio Com. PL
1955).
' Jaskiewicz v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8476 (Ohio Corn. PL
1955).
'
mRoyal Grill v. Nelson, CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 8472 (Ohio Corn. P. 1955);
Stahl v. Board of Review, CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) S 8506 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
'McGee v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8483 (Ohio
App. 1955), reversing the decision of the Common Pleas Court on this point at 5
8446.
Kendall v. Administrator, CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8509 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
Hamilton Provision Co. v. Matthes, CCH U. I. SRv. (Ohio) 5 8457 (Ohio Com.
Pl. 1955).
' 164 Ohio St. 369 (1955).
Uun
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1955
rating account during the period from 1941 to 1951,36 where less than .the
entire business was transferred. The buyer was held not to be a "successor
in interest" for the purpose of obtaining the seller's experience rating ac-
count where any part of the business, however small or temporary, was re-
tained by the seller. In another case, it was held that the employer who
sold a substantial part of its business to another could not appeal from
a redetermination of the contribution rate of the successor, since only the
party whose rate is involved can appeal.37
Two partnerships, commonly owned but operated separately, were
held to be separate employing units for experience rating purposes.38 A
creditor who took over the operation of a debtor's business after default was
held to be a successor in interest and required to assume the predecessor's
liabilities for unpaid contributions,39 but a business which was dosed for
several months as a result of a fire was held not to be a going business
when subsequently acquired, and the buyer did not obtain the experience
rating account of the predecessor. 40
Where, after having received notice of disallowance of benefits to a
former employee, the employer received no notice of a subsequent allow-
ance thereof, it was held that the employer's account could not properly be
charged with the benefits thereafter paid."
Coverage
Where the owner of a beauty parlor rented out space to various ope-
rators, each of whom had her own customers, kept her own records, fur-
nished her own supplies, and paid a weekly fee for the space rented, it
was held that the owner could not properly be considered the employer
of said "'lessees" notwithstanding the fact that the latter had failed to obtain
shop licenses under the state Cosmetology Law.4" The latter situation
Before 1941 the transfer provision included the phrase "in whole or in part." The
deletion of this phrase in the 1941 amendments was discussed in Biber Realty Co. v.
Dunifoo, 84 Ohio App. 532, 82 N.E.2d 565 (1948), and the court of appeals in
that case held that only a total transfer would carry with it the predecessor's experi-
ence rating account thereafter. This view has now been confirmed by the Supreme
Court in the instant case. The Ohio law was again amended in 1951 to permit trans-
fer in connection with the sale of a "dearly segregable and identifiable portion of
an employer's enterprise."
'Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Cornell, CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 3 8473 (Ohio App.
1955).
Church Budget Envelope Co. v. Cornell, CCH U. 1. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8496 (Ohio
App. 1955).
'Jacobs v. Cornell, CCH U. I. SERv. (Ohio) 3 8490 (Ohio COm. P1. 1955).
'Itn re Serv-Rite Inc., CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 8491 (Ohio Com. Al. 1955).
"William Brooks Shoe Co. v. B.U.C., CCH U. I. SERV. (Ohio) 3 8502 (Ohio App.
1955).
"State v. Lowe, 57 Ohio Op. 243, 129 N.E.2d 221 (Cleve. Mun. 1954).
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